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【科苑经管学术论坛】吴肖乐:Sourcing Competition under Cost Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry(9月5日)
发布时间:2018/9/3

科苑经管学术论坛第52期

 

讲座题目:Sourcing Competition under Cost Uncertainty and Information Asymmetry
 

主讲嘉宾:吴肖乐 复旦大学管理学院副教授
 

讲座时间:2018年9月5日(周三)上午10:00—11:30
 

讲座地点:中国科学院大学中关村校区青年公寓6号楼三层第一会议室
 

内容摘要:Driven by increasing costs in the traditionally-regarded low-cost manufacturing bases (e.g., China), many firms have started to outsource their production to the regions of even lower costs (e.g., Southeast Asia). However, a new environment may involve higher cost uncertainty and severer information asymmetry. Motivated by these observations, we consider a sourcing game where competing firms choose between a supplier with transparent certain cost (type-C supplier) and a supplier with potentially lower but less transparent, uncertain cost (type-U supplier). We characterize the equilibrium of the sourcing game and study how different parameters affect the firms' sourcing strategy and profit performance. First, we find that due to information asymmetry, a large market size can make firms prefer the C-supplier to the U-supplier even if the latter has a lower average cost. Second, reducing the cost uncertainty of the U-supplier does not necessarily make it more attractive, which cautions the suppliers when making investments to mitigate cost uncertainty. An improvement of U-supplier's private signal accuracy can make U-suppliers more likely be chosen by manufacturers only when both signal accuracy and cost uncertainty are above a certain level. Third, higher competition intensity leads the diversified sourcing strategy to be more likely adopted if the cost uncertainty of U-supplier is sufficiently large; otherwise, intensified competition can favor either C-supplier or U-supplier. Interestingly, increasing the cost of the C-supplier (e.g., a cost hike in China) may make both sourcing firms better off because it can lead to a new sourcing equilibrium. Finally, this paper contributes to the mechanism design literature by showing that the direction of quantity distortion under the optimal competitive mechanism differs from that under the traditional monopolistic setting.
 

嘉宾简介:吴肖乐,复旦大学管理学院副教授、中科院虚拟经济与数据科学研究中心虚拟商务研究室兼职研究员。2006年毕业于清华大学工业工程系,获学士学位;2011年毕业于圣路易斯华盛顿大学,获博士学位。主要研究方向是供应链管理、风险管理、采购策略、能源与环境。主持包括国家自然科学基金优青项目、面上项目等,入选上海市曙光人才计划和复旦大学卓学计划。曾获中国管理学青年奖、华人学者管理科学与工程协会最佳论文一等奖,上海市第十三届哲学社会科学优秀成果二等奖,中国运筹学会随机服务与运作管理分会优秀青年学者奖,2016 MSOM Meritorious Service Award等。在顶级管理类UTD期刊上发表论文7篇,包括Management Science论文4篇, Manufacturing & Service Operations Management论文2篇, Production and Operations Management论文1篇。